Modifiable Alimony Decree Granted Full Faith and Credit for Future Payments by Woodland, Irwin F.
MODIFIABLE ALIMONY DECREE GRANTED
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR FUTURE PAYMENTS
Light v. Light,
12 Ill.2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1958)
In a cross appeal from a proceeding to register a Missouri divorce
and alimony decree in Illinois under the Illinois Uniform Enforcement
of Judgment Act,' plaintiff, wife, contended that the decree was en-
tided to full faith and credit as to future installments of alimony and
other support money. The court sustained this contention.
2
Alimony decrees which order payments to be made on an install-
ment basis are usually modifiable (as to unaccrued payments) by suitable
motion, in the court which granted the decree. Thus, when an action
is brought to enforce such a decree in a sister state, full faith and
credit has been withheld on the grounds that a modifiable decree is a
non-final order.3 It should be noted that neither the full faith and
credit clause4 nor the legislation which implements it5 specifies that its
terms cover only final judgments.6
The unwillingness to accord full faith and credit to the modifiable
decree has not meant, however, that such decrees are completely un-
enforceable in sister states. Quite the contrary is true. Substantial relief
has been afforded in many cases through the application of comity
principles.
7
Withholding of full faith and credit from the modifiable support
decree has its basis in the doctrine enunciated by the United States Su-
preme Court in the Sistares case. There, a wife had brought suit in
Connecticut to enforce the past due installments of an alimony decree
granted in New York. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,
in reversing a judgment for the wife, had declared that since the alimony
decree was modifiable in New York, it was not entitled to full faith and
credit. The United States Supreme Court reversed, the Court declaring
1 ILL. REV. STAT. C. 77, §§ 88-105 (1957).
2 Light v. Light, 12 Ill.2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1958).
3 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
4 U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
5 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948).
6 "Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor Act of
Congress implementing it says anything about final judgments or, for that matter,
about any judgments. Both require that full faith and credit be given to 'judicial
proceedings' without limitations as to finality." See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77,
87 (1944) (concurring opinion).
7 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 617 (1906) (dissenting opinion)
"[P]rinciples of comity . . . give to the court a certain latitude of discretion,
whereas, under the full faith and credit clause, the consideration given to a decree
in the state where it is rendered is obligatory in every other state."
8 Note 3, salpra.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
that past due installments of a judgment for future alimony rendered
in one state are within the protection of the full faith and credit clause
unless the right to receive the past due alimony is discretionary with the
court which rendered the decree.
This rule, which limits constitutional protection to past due non-
final payments, imposes considerable hardship on the spouse who seeks
compliance of the decree by her defaulting partner who has moved to
another state. It requires a multiplicity of suits with all its attendant
expenses in attorney's fees and other litigation costs. In many cases,
where the amount is small and the litigant poor, the result is that the
defaulting spouse escapes all payment by moving across a state line.
This, in turn, has created a social problem of significant economic
proportions.
9
, Awareness of this social problem, coupled with the desire of pre-
venting their state from -becoming a haven for defaulting husbands'0
has impelled the state courts to grant substantially more recognition to
the out of state modifiable decree than the minimum specified by the
Sistare decision. Thus, for example, Illinois has given judgment on a
Nevada decree for accrued and all future alimony as it becomes due."
Oregon has allowed recovery of future payments once a California
decree was established in Oregon. 2 In Worthley v. Worthley,'3 Cali-
fornia granted enforcement of future payments of a New Jersey decree
although the court pointed out that it was not constitutionally bound
to do so.
14
In the Mississippi case of Fancther v. Gammil i5 is found the closest
approach to the granting of full faith and credit prior to the instant case.
Divorce and alimony were equity proceedings in Mississippi. Thus, ali-
mony payments could be enforced by contempt proceedings as well as by
other traditional modes of equitable enforcement. In Fanchier, the
court was asked to make a Nevada decree for divorce and alimony its
own. The action was opposed by the divorced husband who contended
that the Nevada decree should be treated in Mississippi as a judgment at
law, and thus he denied equitable enforcement. The court, however,
9 Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9C U.L.A. 3. "In June 194-9 the Social Se-
curity Administration announced that the total bill for aid to dependents where
the father was absent and not supporting was approximately $205,000,000 a year
for the nation and the states."
'
0
"[T]he courts of Florida should have the same vital interest in enforcing
[a New York alimony decree] as the courts of the state where such obligation was
originally assumed. . . . [W]e have no desire to make this state a haven for
fugitive husbands." Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So. 2d 292, 294 (Fla. 1950).
'lRule v. Rule, 313 Ill. App. 108, 39 N.E.2d 379 (1942).
12 Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Org. 184, 63 P.2d 897 (1936).
13 Vorthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955).
14"Since the New Jersey decree is both prospectively and retroactively modi-
fiable . . . we are not constitutionally bound to enforce defendints obligations
under it." Worthley v. Worthley, supra note 13, at 22.
15 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927).
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felt that if it adopted the Nevada decree as its own, the constitutional
requirement of full faith and credit required it to give the same standing
to the decree as it gave its own divorce and alimony decrees. The
Fanchier case, therefore, does not hold that modifiable alimony decrees
from sister states are entitled to full faith and credit in Mississippi, but
rather that the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit forbids
Mississippi from placing an out of state decree, once adopted by Mississippi
courts, on a lesser footing than its own decree.
The Illinois court in the instant case, however, has squarely held
that a modifiable decree, even as to future payments is entitled to full
faith and credit. Despite the traditional reluctance to so hold, which is
evidenced by the decisions in the field, there are excellent reasons to
support the holding, of which three may be cited:
1. The increasing mobility of the American public would
seem to require that these decrees be enforced as a matter of
right rather than at the discretion of the various states.
2. Full faith and credit has been given in the analogous
field of child custody. Custody orders are nearly always
modifiable and yet, not only do they receive full faith and
credit in sister states, but the sister states have the right to
modify the orders unilaterally.16
3. Perhaps the most significant reason is found in the
language of the Illinois Uniform Enforcement of Judgment
Act under which this litigation arose. By the terms of the
act," its procedures could not be used to enforce out of state
judgments which were not entitled to full faith and credit.
Thus, to hold that a modifiable alimony decree was not so en-
titled, would be to deny the simple, inexpensive procedure to a
class of litigants that could make peculiarly good use of them.
By making this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court has broadened
the constitutional protection of the full faith and credit clause. It now
remains for a jurisdiction without the compelling phrases of the Uni-
form Act to reach a similar decision.
Irwin F. Woodland
16 New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947) ; Setzer v. Setzer,
251 Wis. 234, 29 N.W.2d 62 (1947).
17 Supra note 1.
18 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 77, § 88a (1957). " 'Foreign Judgment' means any judg-
ment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any State or Territory
which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state." (Italics added.)
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